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Abstract 
Our starting point in this chapter is the ecological tradition’s aspiration “to understand how 
organisms make their way in the world, not how a world is made inside of organisms” (Reed, 1996, 
p. 11). For an organism, “making one’s way in the world” is a continuous process: it is a 
behavioural and metabolic continuity where the organism-environment relation is regulated in a 
way that leaves traces in both the organism and the environment. The prerequisite for describing the 
organism-environment relation as being regulated is that the relation is sufficiently flexible: A 
living system’s flexible, adaptive behaviour is enabled by cognition. Accordingly, a cognitive 
trajectory intertwines with the organism’s behavioural and metabolic processes. We define this 
cognitive trajectory as an emergent pattern in a dynamic organism-environment relation, managed 
by the organism through continuous action-perception cycles. On this view, cognition does not play 
out in a separate, mediational (mental) realm, nor does it constitute a causal power that controls the 
organism’s metabolic and behavioural states. The chapter opens with a critical review of the 
mentalist view on cognition and problem-solving, partly through a critique of the classic methods of 
decomposing problem-solving, partly through a discussion of Ohlsson’s (2011) framework. After 
that we present the ecological framework and suggests that from that perspective, problem-solving 
psychology is the “psychology of the suspended next.” We clarify this view through a presentation 
of how organism-environment interactivity gives rise to distinct cognitive trajectories in two case 
examples: one observed under laboratory conditions, and one in the ‘wild’. Our main proposal is 
that to understand problem-solving, we need to take as a starting point how agents probe their 
cognitive ecology when their automatized routines fail and they find themselves confronted with an 
impasse. Insights, on this view, are not achieved, but enacted.   
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An Ecological Perspective on Insight Problem Solving 
 
A problem is solved when the world manifests a solution, that is, once the world has been shaped to 
overcome the difficulties or challenges posed by the problem. When, as observers, we identify an 
agent’s solution to a problem, we note how the agent shaped the physical environment to address 
the problem. In doing so, we assume that a finished form implies a designer and a plan (cf. 
Dawkins, 1986; Ingold, 2014) from which matter was molded into a solution. However, this 
assumption reflects a hylomorphic bias (Ingold, 2010) that has imbued much work in creativity and 
the psychology of problem solving. We argue, however, that this is an unproductive, and possibly 
misleading, perspective on problem solving: Solutions may be enacted over time and space, but the 
trajectory and the end product may not evidence the design and implementation of a plan. Take the 
Acheulean hand axe: the earliest forms in the archaeological record date from 1.5 million years ago 
(Lycett & von Cramon-taubadel, 2008) and were symmetrically shaped (Malafouris, 2010). This 
symmetry is an interesting problem solving enigma: did our Homo erectus ancestors plan the 
symmetry or was the symmetry a consequence of manufacturing efforts? Malafouris (2010, p. 17) 
encourages us “to abandon our common representational/internalist assumptions, and recognize 
knapping as an act of thought” (emphasis in the original). He argues that the manufacturing 
intention is realized through engaging with the physical properties of the stone and the 
hammerstone. In other words, the intention and the resulting symmetry are emergent properties of 
the manufacturing process; they do not precede manufacture but rather are brought forth through 
manufacture.  
 
The role and importance of interactivity and engagement with the material world, and the more 
general consideration of the cognitive ecosystem (Hutchins, 2010) within which thinking is enacted, 
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is underplayed or ignored in traditional problem solving research (with important exceptions, such 
as Kirsh, 2009). In this chapter we aim to demonstrate the crucial relevance of considering the 
material and interactive context of reasoning for insight. We open the chapter with a review of the 
prevailing mentalist paradigm as eloquently outlined by Ohlsson (2011). We then explore how 
cognition serves organisms, and draw much of our exposition from Anderson’s (2014) arguments 
on neural reuse and the interactive brain that underscore the poverty of the mentalist paradigm. We 
outline what an ecological perspective on problem solving entails theoretically and 
methodologically. We close the chapter by reviewing some of our recent work on problem solving 
under laboratory conditions and in the wild that proceeds from an analysis of the tools and levels of 
interactivity promoted by different cognitive ecosystems.  
 
Problem Solving as the Mentalist Sees It 
Many attempts have been made to decompose the complexity of problem-solving by identifying 
various relevant parameters. For instance, Schraw, Dunkle, and Bendixen (1995) distinguish 
between two different problem types: ill-defined problems and well-defined problems. The 
distinction depends on the degree to which the problem has a specific goal, a clearly defined 
solution path, and a clearly defined solution. Another distinction is between different process types: 
analytic problem-solving processes (based on deductive and inductive reasoning) and insight 
problem-solving processes which requires a (spontaneous or laborious) change of perspective on the 
problem (e.g., Fleck & Weisberg, 2013). Finally, it is widely acknowledged that problem-solving in 
experimental settings differs from problem-solving in everyday activities (Kirsh, 2009; Ormerod & 
Ball, in press). Thus, problem solving differs between different situation types and between 
different problem domains (medicine, mathematics, sports, etc.). 
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While such typologies are conducive to an overview of the field, the identified dimensions are 
conspicuously static: they present us with a view where unchanging agents face unchanging 
problems in an unchanging setting, depending on unchanging cognitive processes. The typological 
dimensions also have a strikingly circumstantial character. Although problem solving by definition 
is a process from problem to solution, the above categories focus less on actual processes, and more 
on circumstantial parameters. Even the distinction between analytic problem-solving processes and 
insight problem-solving processes, usually transmogrifies into a problem typology. For instance, 
Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009:362) make a “distinction between insight and non-insight [= analytic] 
problems” (not processes). Such distinctions build on the assumption that the problem-solving 
process is causally determined by the problem type (mediated by a mental problem representation; 
cf. Bowden & Grunewald, this volume).  
 
What these considerations show is that, like all other fields, problem-solving research is scaffolded 
by a set of theoretical and methodological assumptions. And like in all other fields, one must 
regularly reflect on the appropriateness of such assumptions. To take one example, Ohlsson (2011: 
ch. 2) presents these assumptions explicitly. Ohlsson’s starting point is the founding assumption of 
classical cognitive science, namely “the insight that an intelligent agent […] can be modeled in a 
precise way by specifying its representations, its basic processes and its control structure” (Ohlsson, 
2011, p. 37). According to this assumption, “to explain a behavior (or a regularity therein) is to 
specify a program, that is, a control structure, a set of processes and a stock of representations, that 
generates this behavior (or regularity)” (p. 37). A cognitive psychology along these lines is named 
mentalism, “if it needs any other name than common sense” (p. 28). From a mentalist point of view, 
“mind is the proper subject matter of psychology” (p. 25), and “mind is a system” (p. 28) that 
“consists of representations” (p. 29). Further, Ohlsson adds to this system a number of “cognitive 
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functions like seeing, remembering, thinking and deciding [that] are implemented by processes that 
create, utilize and revise representations. The processes are coordinated by a control structure” (p. 
29). The central notion here is that of representations: on the one hand, processes of transforming 
representations constitute cognitive functions, while they, on the other hand, are coordinated by a 
“central executive.” Ohlsson offers us two proofs for the existence of representations. First, “the 
exercise of visualizing something that is not present proves that mind is representational” (Ohlsson, 
2011, p. 30), and second “our ability to mentally manipulate the present, the past, the future, the 
abstract and the fantastical highlight and prove the representational nature of mind” (p. 31). 
 
The Shortcomings of Mentalism 
As noted by Ohlsson, the mentalist position has been criticized from different quarters (Anderson, 
2003, 2014; Anderson, Richardson, & Chemero, 2012; Froese & Di Paolo, 2011; Gibson, 1966, 
1979; Hutchins, 1995, 2010, 2014; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2008; 
Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). One point of critique is launched against the idea that the task 
of the mind is the same as that of a scientist facing the world, namely to carry out inferences 
(Anderson, 2014). In order to allow the individual to navigate in the world, the mind establishes 
models of how the world functions: “from incomplete and fragmentary data, one generates 
hypotheses (or models) for the true nature of the world, which are then tested against and modified 
in light of further incoming sensory stimulation” (Anderson, 2014, p. 121). Accordingly, “cognition 
is post-perceptual―even in some sense aperceptual―representation rich and deeply decoupled 
from the environment” (Anderson, 2014, p. 121). The inferential process thus converts sensory 
input into a map of the world, according to which the individual can act in the world. Two 
important objections can be offered. The first is that off line cognition that manipulate mental 
content may be “common among academics and can sometimes be induced in experimental 
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subjects, but it is relatively rare in the global cognitive ecology. It is also deceptive. Far from being 
free from the influences of culture, private reflection is a deeply cultural practice that draws on and 
is enacted in coordination with rich cultural resources” (Hutchins, 2010, p. 792). Second, 
generalizing from such systems assumes that there is a single class of intelligent agents, and that 
“animal, human, robot or space alien” (Ohlsson, 2011, p. 37) is each part of that class. This is a 
category mistake. Unlike computers and calculators, brains are not primarily in the business of 
constructing observer-independent models of the world; rather they are in the business of getting us 
around and managing our interactions with the world.  
 
The Turing-Newell tradition (e.g., Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958) contributed heuristic models that 
describe behaviour. But a model is not an explanation. A model only functions as an explanation 
under the assumption that the model has a real-life ontological correlate, and representations have 
not been shown to have such a correlate. In fact, it might even be impossible to do so, because the 
model specifies the agent’s “representations, its basic processes and its control structure 
independently of their material embodiment” (Ohlsson, 2011, p. 37). The real-life physical correlate 
of representations is exactly a matter of their material embodiment. 
 
Towards an Ecological Alternative 
To explain a behavioural pattern, it must be kept in mind that living beings are not primarily 
cognizers preoccupied with modelling the world; their task is to make their way in the world, 
seeking out opportunities and avoiding dangers. Accordingly, the task of psychology is “to 
understand how organisms make their way in the world, not how a world is made inside of 
organisms” (Reed, 1996, p. 11). For an organism, “making one’s way in the world” is a matter of 
upholding homeostasis through the regulation the organism-environment relations. The prerequisite 
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for describing the organism-environment relation as being regulated is that the relation is 
sufficiently flexible: the organism must be able to adapt to its environment––or make its 
environment adapt to it––and it must be capable of exhibiting behavioural flexibility under different 
circumstances. Accordingly, the basic raison d’être for cognition in living beings is to exert such 
flexible, adaptive behaviour that allows individuals (or groups) to regulate the organism-
environment relation.  
 
Second, having established how cognition serves living beings, we can now turn to the question of 
how it works. An ecological account  emphasizes the real-time coupling between action and 
perception without “epistemic mediators” (Anderson, 2014, p. 138). Thus, perception is neither 
inferential nor representational: it is exploratory and performative. A living being probes its 
environment in order to detect action possibilities. Within the ecological tradition, Gibson (1979) 
coined the term affordance for those action possibilities. An affordance is a relation between the 
organism and the aspect of the environment that constitutes the action possibility1.  As affordances 
are relational, they depend not only on relatively invariant features of the environment, but also on 
the organism’s ability to engage in a given activity (e.g., Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010). 
 
A non-representational model of cognition as embedded in action-perception cycles is not 
contradicted by Ohlsson’s examples of visualising absent structures and imagining the future. We 
typically visualise something in order to engage in an activity, such as drawing absent or past 
structures, deciding on future holiday plans, or understanding Ohlsson’s argument. This is 
																																																						
1 As argued in Steffensen (2016), the relationality of the affordance is a “thick relation.” A thick relation implies that “it 
is not the relation per se that constitutes the affordance, but rather the iterative interactivity through which the agent 
upholds the relation, perceives environmental structures, and acts in the world” (Steffensen, 2016, p. 36). Further, 
“given its relational thickness, an affordance is nonlinear, dynamical and inherently unstable: stretches of interactivity 
may bring forth affordances that were hitherto unnoticed. Such small changes in the layout of affordances may […] 
create a large-scale restructuring of the layout of affordances that in turn bring about observable changes in behaviour” 
(ibid.). 
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compatible with an action-perception model, if the action-perception cycles are allowed to function 
on multiple timescales (Steffensen & Pedersen, 2014): Perceptions at time tn may condition actions 
at time tn+1, given that the organism-environment relation supports a sufficiently rich memory. This 
memory can be described as a representation, but as long as we cannot pin down its biological 
manifestation, the “representation” is merely a proxy for something still not understood. 
 
The third implication is of a methodological nature. It has to do with how mentalism has shaped the 
design and interpretation of problem-solving experiments. Thus, when Ohlsson (2011, p. 26) for 
instance assumes that “to understand why the person performed the task at hand in the way he did, 
we need to know what he was thinking,” the rationale is that the performance is caused by thinking: 
“Speaking metaphorically, behavior is the end result of chains of billiard-ball-type interactions 
among representations.” (Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003, p. 332). 
 
A general problem is that since mentalism builds on the metaphor of efficient cause, the Newtonian 
metaphor “strictly limits discoveries to cause-and-effect relations” (Van Orden et al., 2003, p. 332) 
between representation and behaviour, between inner mind (cause) and outer behaviour (effect). 
This gives rise to the problem of why an agent opts for one action rather than another (or none at 
all). For the Newtonian model to work, the mind has to contain a specific kind of intentional 
representation: “Intentions are representations that set in motion a causal chain. To have the 
intention to act is to cause the act to happen” (Van Orden et al., 2003, p. 332). However, as Van 
Orden and colleagues observe, the weakness of this this view is that “intentional acts remain forever 
groundless, open ended, mysterious, or magical. How do intentions come into existence? What is 
the cause of the cause of purposive behavior?” (Van Orden et al., 2003, p. 332).  
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The Suspended Next 
Cognition enables us to get along in our lives. It is an unbroken trajectory that intertwines with the 
organism’s behavioural and metabolic processes. Thus, we can define a cognitive trajectory as an 
emergent pattern in a dynamic organism-environment relation, managed by the organism through 
continuous action-perception cycles. A cognitive trajectory exhibits both continuity and 
discontinuity: on the fast bodily timescale of action-perception cycles it is continuous, but on a 
slower event timescale it self-organizes episodically (Steffensen & Pedersen, 2014; Uryu, 
Steffensen, & Kramsch, 2014). We are specifically interested in understanding the specific changes 
in the cognitive trajectory that we refer to as problem solving. Even a first glance indicates that 
problem-solving accords with the overall description above: it is a dynamical process that 
reconfigures the organism-environment system from a situation in which the agent is stuck to a 
situation where the agent moves forward.  Typically, it is structured as two discontinuous equilibria: 
stabilized phases of first unsuccessful then successful attempts at solving the problem are 
interrupted by a short episode of overcoming the impasse of the first phase.  
 
In itself, this structural similarity does not warrant that the ecological model can be transferred into 
the realm of problem-solving psychology. After all, there are important differences between the 
kinds of situations investigated by ecological psychologists and problem-solving psychologists. The 
former group is occupied with problems like the outfielder problem―“how does an [baseball] 
outfielder put herself in a position to catch a fly ball?” (Anderson, 2014, p. 137) ―or selecting and 
throwing objects (Anderson, 2014, p. 129). Such problems are characterized by a high degree of 
behavioural fluidity: the outfielder engages in continuous action-perception cycles that allow 
him/her to navigate on the field, and the thrower can interact with the different artefacts in order to 
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select the preferred one for throwing. It is worth considering how problem solving differs from the 
phenomena studied by ecological psychologists.  
 
What is so noteworthy for problem-solving tasks is the interruption of the basic action-perception 
continuity. If we accept Anderson’s premise that “the fundamental cognitive problem facing an 
organism [is] deciding what to do next” (Anderson, 2014, p. 135), problem-solving psychology 
studies situations where “next” is suspended. While most people “know” how much to pay for ten 
apples if they each cost 20 pence (i.e., they can automatically pick a £2 coin in their purse), most 
will face a problem finding out how many 2 cm x 2 cm tiles are needed to cover a 5 m x 6 m floor. 
In such situations we are forced to suspend our automatised action-perception cycle and depend on 
incremental methods, based on prior experience with simpler versions of the task (“one square 
meter requires 50 times 50 tiles, i.e., 2,500 tiles; 5 m x 6 m is 30 square meters; then I need 30 times 
2,500 tiles, i.e., 3 times 25,000 tiles, i.e., 75,000 tiles!”). Problem solving sometimes involves the 
improvised assembly of elements in such a manner that the engineered solution assigns new 
functional roles to the different elements. Famously, Mission Control had to improvise a rig to 
adapt a carbon dioxide scrubber to fit the lunar module, using only artefacts also found on board the 
spacecraft during Apollo 13 (Augier, Shariq & Vendelø, 2001). More prosaically, participants in 
Duncker’s candle problem are tasked with discovering how to attach a candle to a vertical surface, 
with the candle, matches and box full of push pins as material (Duncker, 1945). Given the unusual 
character of such situations, agents rarely have prior experience with the specific problem. 
Crucially, the handyman, the NASA engineers, and the Duncker participants face situations where 
the basic action-perception cycles that characterize all living systems are insufficient for achieving a 
goal: “what to do next” (Anderson, 2014, p. 135) is obfuscated because there is no next from the 
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agent’s point of view. Therefore, from an ecological point of view, problem-solving psychology is 
the psychology of the suspended next. 
 
It is characteristic of the suspended next that the lack of experience-based solutions forces the agent 
to think, that is to search the problem space in order to come up with possible solutions. In a 
mentalist interpretation, this is evidence for the existence of a rich inner representation that can be 
investigated by the agent. This may be, but it does not entail that this form of ‘thinking’ is 
representative of problem solving in the wild. As Clark (2010, p. 24) puts it “we often do lots of 
stuff entirely in our heads, using inner surrogates for absent states of affairs. But it is surely worth 
noticing just how much of our cognitive activity is not like that; brains like ours will go to 
extraordinary length to avoid having to resort to fully environmentally detached reflection (...)”. 
Rather, faced with the suspended next, agents seem to resort to action-perception cycles that 
function as “solution-probing” (Steffensen, 2017): by using models (Cowley & Nash, 2013), 
artefacts (Fioratou & Cowley, 2009; Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015), or 
properties of the environment (Steffensen, 2017), agents depend on interactivity to come up with a 
solution. If one accepts the view that problem-solving psychology is the psychology of the 
suspended next, it follows that both ecological psychologists and problem-solving psychologists are 
concerned with cognitive ecosystems (Hutchins, 2010, 2014). Hence, the difference is not one 
between ecologically embedded cognition and mentally-based cognition rather, the main difference 
is the level of automaticity with which agents explore and exploit the system.  
 
Unfortunately, this point has been neglected because problem-solving psychology―given its 
mentalist assumptions―has created an impoverished, desert-like cognitive ecosystem, typically 
consisting of an agent, a piece of paper and a pencil (Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). To counter this 
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approach, we call for a problem-solving psychology that takes a starting point in the “lay-out of 
affordances” (Chemero, 2000) for problem solving. Rather than resorting to models of an abstract 
problem space, an ecological approach to problem solving takes a starting point in how agents 
probe their cognitive ecology, with a particular view to how agents animate the organism-
environment system when their automatized routines fail and they find themselves confronted with 
the suspended next. Insights, on this view, are not achieved, but enacted. Ippolito and Tweney 
(1995) stressed that “the process of insight is only explainable when the setting is carefully 
examined. Insights emerge from a dynamic blend of context and behaviour.” (p. 435) 
 
Interactivity: Charting Cognitive Trajectories 
We now turn to the question of what a post-mentalist position implies for problem-solving 
psychology. Following recent work in “Distributed Language and Cognition” (Cowley & Nash, 
2013; Cowley & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2017; Kirsh, 1997; Steffensen, 2012, 2017, 2015), we refer to 
the agent’s active adaptive engagement with the world with the term interactivity and define as 
sense-saturated coordination that gives rise to results (to adapt Steffensen, 2017). Coordination is 
key because the organism, in order to stay alive, is bound to uphold far-from-equilibrium 
homeostasis through regulating the organism-environment relation. This regulation amounts to a 
coordination of material, energetic and informational processes between organism and environment. 
Breathing the fresh air, biting into an apple, throwing a stone, seeing a deer in the woods, are all 
coordinative processes that depend on bodily movements in the environment.  
 
One class of coordinating processes stand out, namely those that require a reciprocal flow of 
intercorporeal movements, prototypically between two conspecific organisms. Embracing one’s 
spouse, ordering a pizza, chit-chatting on the beach, are all coordinative processes that depend on 
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intercorporeal movements between two or more agents. From a phenomenological and ethical point 
of view, the two types of coordination differ widely because we relate to another human, as well as 
to many animals, significantly differently from how we relate to air, rocks and apples. But seen 
from a basic bodily perspective, the two types are similar: We only have one body, and we cannot 
separate it into different spheres that relate to different parts of our environment. The crucial 
difference, then, is that while the former type of coordinative processes is fully situated, the latter 
depends on the agent’s ability to recruit situation-transcending (Linell, 2009) resources that can 
guide, enable or constrain the coordinative dynamics. If we compare two examples of 
vocalisation―e.g., shouting at a bear out of fear, and saying “hello” to one’s neighbour―we would 
miss something important if we reduced them to just two acts of vocalisation. In the latter, the agent 
vocalises by drawing on a history of socioculture that constrains the vocalisation and the bodily 
movements (e.g., waving a hand). In other words, the coordinative processes are saturated with 
sense, that is, sociocultural resources through which past events impact on present events. Again, 
sense-saturated coordination between two human beings (e.g., a conversation, a dance, or a football 
match) differs from sense-saturated between a human agent and the non-human environment (e.g., 
the cultural significance of watching the sun set or smelling a rose). In the former case, “the 
involved parties must co-ordinate their activity […]; all parties exercise power over each other, 
influencing what the other will do, and usually there is some degree of (tacit) negotiation over who 
will do what, when and how” (Kirsh, 1997, pp. 82-83). Whether there is one or more agents 
involved in some activity, we can describe it in terms of interactivity if it depends on real-time 
coordinative dynamics between agent(s) and the environment (including other agents), and if the 
bodily dynamics are sense-saturated. As such, a cognitive trajectory is an emergent pattern 
constituted by sense-saturated coordination of action-perception cycles between agents and between 
agents and the environment. 
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In our updated definition of interactivity, a third criterion is added, as it is required that the 
coordination gives rise to results. On the one hand, this seems a superfluous addition, in so far that 
coordinative dynamics change the relation between the organism and the environment, and such 
changes are clearly results of coordinative dynamics. On the other hand, if we only described 
behaviour at the level of action-perception cycles, we would miss the self-organising character of 
human behaviour. Thus, making coffee, riding a bike, writing an article, etc., all depend on action-
perception-based coupling between agent and environment, and the action-perception cycles are in 
a sense continuous. At the same time, however, the examples illustrate that behaviour, on a 
timescale longer than the here-and-know, is discontinuous: assuming that interactivity involves 
action on multiple timescales (Steffensen & Pedersen, 2014; Uryu, Steffensen, & Kramsch, 2014), 
action-perception cycles self-organise into episodes that can be identified through the results they 
give rise to. In other words, interactivity depends on action on faster timescales, while it contributes 
to results on slower timescales.  
 
The multi-scalar nature of human interactivity helps explain the changes along cognitive 
trajectories. Thus, because the coordinative dynamics of organism-environment systems are not 
taking place at a constant speed on a single timescale, they exhibit the same properties as 
punctuated equilibria, that is, longer periods of stability are interrupted by short periods of change 
(to borrow from Gould & Eldredge, 1977). The self-organised nature of human behaviour allows us 
to describe a cognitive trajectory by tracking the history of these reconfiguration points: when were 
results achieved? What were their enabling conditions? How did they emerge from interactivity? 
From Järvilehto’s (2009, p.118) systemic psychology perspective: “the research should start from 
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the determination of the results of behaviour and lead to the necessary constituents of the living 
system determining the achievement of these results”. 
 
Problem Solving in the Wild and in the Lab 
Having thus described interactivity as “the glue of cognition” (Kirsh, 2006, p. 250) that enables us 
to get along in our lives, individually as well as collectively, we now turn to the question of what 
this implies for problem-solving psychology. In particular, we are interested in understanding the 
specific changes in the cognitive trajectory that we refer to as problem-solving. Even a first glance 
indicates that problem-solving accords with the overall description above. It is inherently 
processual; it reconfigures the organism-environment system from a situation in which the agent is 
stuck to a situation where the agent moves forward. Typically, it is structured as two punctuated 
equilibria: a stabilised phase of unsuccessful attempts at solving the problem is interrupted by a 
short episode of overcoming the impasse, which in turn lead to a longer phase where the 
restructuring leads to results defined by the specific task under scrutiny. 
 
In what follows we present two case studies of how a cognitive trajectory is enacted as a person and 
a dyad, respectively, face a suspended next, and overcomes it through a contingent pattern of 
action-perception cycles. We begin with a study of problem-solving in the lab, as that is the default 
object of study in problem-solving psychology. The case is a single subject solving the 17 Animals 
problem in a psychological laboratory in the UK. Our second case features problem-solving in the 
wild. It concerns two Danish office workers who struggle to make their electronic invoice system 
work. 
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A “Pure” Insight Problem: 17 Animals. We research problem solving in the lab by engineering 
thinking environments that afford different levels of interactivity. Our explanation of insight is 
bound to the environment through which it is enacted. This perspective makes unique predictions 
about the prospect of participants solving a problem in particular environments. Different cognitive 
ecosystems enact different forms of thinking and different problem solving trajectories, some that 
perpetuate an unproductive interpretation of the problem, others that bootstrap participants out of an 
impasse by drawing attention and shaping action possibilities that gradually encourage the 
formulation of a more productive interpretation of the problem. In our recent work we have used the 
17 animals problem (henceforth 17A) to explore the cognitive ecosystem hypothesis.  
 
The 17A problem is a ‘pure’ insight problem (Weisberg, 1995) requiring abandoning an arithmetic 
interpretation and adopting one involving overlapping sets. Participants read: how do you place 17 
animals in four pens such that each one of the four enclosures contains an odd number of animals? 
The formulation lures participants to apply an arithmetic method to yield an answer. However, the 
direct transfer of well learned arithmetic skills and facts produces unsatisfactory solutions. The 
problem is simple and the conversational pragmatics suggests there is a solution; the participants 
anticipate only a momentary impasse. However, participants often cast aside their arithmetic 
intuitions, and labour the direct arithmetic method by listing odd numbers between 1 and 17 to 
determine, by selecting and discarding various combinations of 4 numbers, which ones can add to 
17. This brute strategy, impervious to elementary arithmetic principles as they apply to whole 
numbers, does not work, of course. Still, we have witnessed participants pursue it for the full 10 
minutes allocated to solving the problem. The impasse is broken once the the problem is seen as one 
involving the arrangement of sets and the distribution of individuated entities in set intersections 
rather than the manipulation of undecomposed number symbols (see Fig. 1).  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
In a series of experiments (Vallée-Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau & Sirota, 2016), we 
created two different cognitive ecosystems (Hutchins, 2010) by asking participants to solve the 17A 
problem in two different task environments within a 10-minute period. In one, participants were 
given a stylus and an electronic tablet to sketch a solution. In another, they were given pipe cleaning 
pieces and animal figurines to build a model of the solution. One environment favoured the 
application of an arithmetic solution: Participants drew four separate enclosures—either as separate 
circles or a cross splitting the work surface into quadrants—creating a static backdrop over which 
they laboured the arrangement of four odd numbers, primarily using whole number symbols rather 
than distributing individuated marks or dots corresponding to the 17 ‘animals’. This thinking 
ecosystem encourages the maintenance of an unproductive interpretation and problem solving 
attempts; in other words, it was harder for participant to bootstrap themselves out of a deep 
arithmetic groove. In the first of two experiments, no participants solved the problem this way, in 
the second, 17% did. In the model building condition, participants did not have a writing 
instrument, and hence could not employ and manipulate numerical symbols that cued the direct 
transfer of an arithmetic strategy; they had to solve the problems by distributing 17 individual 
pieces. More important, the pens themselves were the focus of intense scrutiny just by virtue of the 
fact that participants had to build them. The design and spatial layouts of the pens were no longer 
the static background over which numbers were slotted. Rather, participants worked on them, 
changed their shape, and size, and through this manufacturing process, exposed themselves to many 
different configurations. The model building ecosystem encouraged a figure-ground reversal, where 
the pens were as much the focus of attention as the numbers (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2015). 
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Participants were much more likely to solve the problem embedded in that interactive ecosystem 
(43% and 57% across two experiments2) than in the ecosystem with stylus and tablet. 
 
These results suggest that a characterization of the task ecology is a key requirement in the 
developing a theoretical account of problem solving. The model building ecosystem produced a 
malleable problem presentation: Participants’ actions modified key features of the problem, which 
produced a higher rate of solutions. An impasse is overcome by acting in the world. A dynamic 
protomodel of the solution cues certain actions, guides the allocation of attentional resources, which 
lead to physical modifications and a shifting topography of action affordances. Thinking in this 
ecosystem is less internal and more likely to be governed by actions and action affordances. Some 
of these actions may not be guided by a plan or specific hypotheses (Steffensen et al., 2016) and 
reflect un-mediated perception-action loops. In these experiments, there is evidence that the 
problem is restructured as reflected in the manner in which the physical features of the problem are 
constructed. Thus restructuring is physically manifest, and we would argue that a more productive 
interpretation of the problem dovetails the changes in the world, it does not anticipate them, or 
cause them. A workable solution to the problem is not planned and realized all at once: it emerges 
along a contingent spatio-temporal trajectory. That trajectory in fact charts the genesis of insight, it 
is not predicated on an insight.  
 
These results underscore the importance of taking a systemic view of thinking. Minimally, a system 
is an agent-environment configuration wrought through interactivity. The system is a dynamic set of 
resources, some internal to the reasoner, others external, that are assembled to scaffold cognitive 
processes. The nature of the external resources, and of the singular system that is configured, will 
																																																						
2 In the second experiment, participants were given pre-formed hoops with which to build models (see Vallée-
Tourangeau et al., 2016, pp.199-200). 
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determine the range of actions, the type of interactivity, which in turn will favour some results over 
others. Problem solving as observed in our lab with the 17A problem is largely explained by the 
type of system the agent-artefact coupling produced. Using the method of Cognitive Event 
Analysis, Steffensen et al. (2016) analysed the video recording of one successful participant in some 
detail: over 1200 annotations for a 10-minute session. For the first two minutes the participant spent 
time building enclosures. In the process, she created overlapping pens on a number of occasions, 
which were promptly disassembled to maintain a configuration of 4 non-overlapping enclosures. 
Four minutes ensue during which the participant sought to distribute the 17 figurines in a manner to 
comply with the problem instructions. Frustrated with her inability to crack the problem, the 
participant placed all the animals in a heap in the middle of the work surface and then focused her 
attention on the pens. While fiddling with the shape of one enclosure, she accidentally created an 
overlap. She proceeded to remove it, but inhibited her action just as she was about to touch one of 
the pens. Immediately after, rather than dissolving the overlap, she created another two intersections 
by moving the two remaining pens, and with these three overlapping areas, she had achieved a 
configuration that cued some interesting possibility for her, possibilities that failed to stir new ways 
of distributing the animals earlier in the session. Accordingly, she now proceeded to distribute the 
animals to match the odd number constraint.  
 
When did she solve the problem? She solved it when she constructed a working model of the 
solution. Did she solve it when she produced overlapping sets? We would argue that she did not, 
but rather sought encouragement from this new arrangement and then systematically worked at 
populating this new enclosure configuration and over time realized that it could work. Her actions 
in the first 6 minutes of the session appeared to be guided by a plan reflecting an incorrect 
arithmetic interpretation of the problem. She set out to build separate enclosures, and then laboured 
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a direct arithmetic strategy. But her actions at the event pivot, that is when she took advantage of an 
overlap, did not reflect a plan that is actioned; rather actions distilled a plan, a working solution was 
enacted rather than mentally simulated.  
 
We may ask how or where such a problem solving trajectory fits in the traditional dichotomy 
between the business-as-usual (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995) and special 
processes camps. On the one hand, her solution is the result of a certain contingent path: how 
enclosures were built initially, how distribution efforts failed, how an accidental overlap was 
opportunistically seized and exploited to drive new distribution efforts. The event pivot at the 6-min 
mark is an important discontinuity but the significance of the overlap was noticed only at a certain 
point in the trajectory; earlier accidental overlaps were disassembled. Thus, we understand her 
success from a contingent-historical perspective of failures and adjustments, and in that respect the 
solution appears to reflect largely conscious analytic processes that chart a continuous path to a 
working model. However, we resist the temptation of taking sides in the business-as-usual vs 
special processes debate: This debate is couched in mentalist terms, and our aim is to stress the 
unproductive commitment to mentalism and methodological individualism that such a 
perspective—and debate— entails. The ontological locus of cognition is not the individual, it is the 
system. From an ecological perspective, problem solving is enacted. The working model of a 
solution is evidence of having solved the problem. The physical model was constructed into a 
working solution, but it is unfounded to say that the construction reflected the implementation of a 
plan (cf. Ingold, 2010).  
 
The Invoice Case. The advantage of lab experiments is that the researcher can create a cognitive 
ecosystem that is likely to yield given behavioural outcomes. For instance, the 17A problem 
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description is formulated to encourage an interpretation that renders the problem initially unsolvable 
for most people. In real life, the ecological contingencies of our environment are sufficiently 
resilient and redundant to prevent such stabilised misinterpretations: First, rather than meeting tasks 
in the shape of written instructions, such as Duncker’s “attach a candle to the wall, using only this 
box of tacks, these candles and these matches,” we experience, say, a need of light above an area 
adjacent to a vertical surface. Second, while we all have anecdotal experiences that resemble the 
experiences of the lab subjects (e.g., the feeling of being lost and stuck because we have interpreted 
some environmental obstacle in a way that turned out to be wrong), the systematic documentation 
of such unexpected events is methodologically challenging.  
 
The invoice case is remarkable because it is in fact an example where a misinterpretation of a 
naturalistic task (i.e., a task that emerges in a real-life ecosystem, without being designed to do so) 
leads to an impasse that is overcome in the same way as impasses are overcome in the lab. The 
invoice case features two Danish office workers, anonymised as Black and White (their respective 
shirt colour). The task facing the two protagonists is to utilise the computer software that generates 
the company’s invoices, and which is provided by another department in the company. Seen from 
the vantage point of Black and White, the suspended next emerges because the invoices generated 
by the computer software do not contain a unique business identification number (the so-called 
CVR number) that enables the invoice receiver to pay the bill. Parallel to how the solvers of the 
17A task are led to believe that their problem was an arithmetic one, Black and White are led astray 
by assuming that the root of the problem is a flawed software system that fails to print the CVR 
number in the invoice. Accordingly, their solution strategy is to feed the CVR number into the 
software, so it is printed along with the rest of invoice information. However, the solution is much 
more mundane: the CVR number already appears on the company’s letterhead, and as such, there is 
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no need to print it again! The software programmers knew that, but Black and White miss this 
important point because they, for economic reasons, have tested the system by using blank print 
paper rather than the more expensive letterhead paper. For an overview of the situation, see Figure 
2. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Steffensen (2013) traces a 55 seconds trajectory along which the cognitive ecosystem, animated by 
Black and White, realises that the solution to the problem is to choose another print tray in the 
software’s print menu. This investigation also relies on Cognitive Event Analysis, and it shows how 
small variations in the repetitive structure caused by the suspended next in fact are crucial to 
overcome the impasse. More specifically, the cognitive trajectory goes through three cycles before 
the impasse is overcome. The cyclicity of the cognitive trajectory is conditioned by the 
organisational asymmetry between the two protagonists: Black is the main person responsible for 
the invoices and their interaction takes place at his desk. Accordingly, the main activity consists of 
Black recapitulating what the problem is, and as he does so three times, each recapitulation 
indicates a new cycle in their problem-solving.  
 
The first cycle begins with Black’s succinct description of the problem with the invoice: but I can 
tell you there is no one whatsoever who will pay that invoice.3 From an informational point of view, 
Black’s utterance is vacuous, as White is already aware of the shortcomings of the invoice: No, I am 
aware of that. That’s why we told them that it was no good. But that was not our business because it 
was as agreed upon. That was it. But it might be that you can get a better answer, I was just told 
																																																						
3 All utterances are translated from Danish into English. For the original Danish wording, see Steffensen (2013). 
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that’s was how it was.4 While White reports his exchange with the programmers, Black is looking 
for the CVR number, presumably in order to enter it manually into the computer. Accordingly, in 
this first cycle we both see the dyad’s frustration with the other department and their fixation on the 
computer software as an input-output system. No solution is achieved. 
 
Superficially, the second cycle resembles the first. It even starts with Black uttering the exact same 
five words: But I can tell you… The rest of his opening utterance does not add much new 
information either: This one they’ll just discard. This one they will never ever pay it. It will never 
get paid, this one. However, while from an informational point of view, the second cycle is highly 
repetitious, it is not so from an interactivity-oriented viewpoint. Thus, Black’s utterance contains 
three instances of the marked deictic this one (Danish ‘den her’, literally ‘this here’), and each of 
them functions as nodal points that change the interactional dynamics between the two protagonists. 
Thus, while Black utters the first deictic (in this one they’ll just discard), he picks up the flawed 
invoice printed on blank paper and holds it in his left hand (cf. Fig. 2). This action prompts White to 
reorient his attention, and now, like Black, he gazes on the invoice. After a 2.2 seconds long gaze at 
the invoice, the two men use the second occurrence of this one to redirect their gaze to each other, 
before Black – after 1.6 seconds eye contact – shakes the paper lightly at the thirds occurrence of 
this one. In other words, while the second cycle is largely a repetition of the first on an 
informational level, the dynamics in the dialogical system (Trasmundi & Steffensen, 2016) change 
significantly: the two subjects reorient their attention to the invoice, and it thus becomes an 
important cognitive artefact in the cognitive ecosystem.  
 
																																																						
4 In White’s response, ‘them’ refers to the software engineers who have programmed the invoice software. 
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The importance of the invoice as a cognitive artefact capable of triggering changes in the problem-
solving trajectory is evident in the third cycle. In this 8.6 s long sequence, Black once again states 
what the problem is, but the introduction of the new cognitive artefact prompts him to do so in a 
way that differs from the first two cycles. This difference is evident from both his words and his 
embodied behaviour. On a linguistic level, Black opts for a new strategy for stating the nature of the 
problem; thus, rather than describing the problem from his – or the company’s – point of view, he 
now adopts the invoice receiver’s point of view. This is apparent in his five consecutive utterances 
in this cycle:5 
 
If it were me then it was just thrown on the pile. (0.7)  
I can’t pay that. (0.4)  
Why can’t I pay it? (0.8)  
There is no CVR number on it. (0.9)  
you can’t send an invoice without a CVR number. (0.4) 
 
The two central observations here are, first, that Black uses a well-known formulaic conditional (If 
it were me) to establish a hypothetical thought experiment, and, second, that the ‘I’ within this 
thought experiment is not himself, but rather the receiver of the invoice. Thus, the utterances I can’t 
pay that and Why can’t I pay it? only makes sense, if it is interpreted as Black’s way of projecting 
the invoice receiver’s reaction to an invoice without a CVR number. The ‘I’ refers, not to the 
speaker, but to the protagonist of Black’s narrative, and the present tense of the modal verb ‘can’ 
does not refer to the time of speaking, but to the future point of time where the invoice is handled 
by the invoice receiver. Thus, from a linguistic point of view, Black recalibrates the deictic system: 
while normally, speakers organise their speech around a deictic origo of I-here-now, the deictic 
origo becomes virtual in Black’s enactment of the invoice receiver’s point of view. 
 
																																																						
5 The numbers in parentheses indicate length of the pauses between his utterances. 
ECOLOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING   26 
However, it is not only linguistic means that prompt Black – and consequently White as his 
interlocutor – to adopt the receiver’s point of view. Thus, during the first utterance, If it were me 
then it was just thrown on the pile (Danish, hvis det var mig så røg den bare hen i stakken), Black 
also enacts the receiver’s perspective. He lets go of the paper, which drops 3-4 cm, and he then 
catches the paper again (cf. Figure 3). Having caught the paper, Black then continues by moving his 
hand forward and throwing the paper into a pile of papers at the far end of the table. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Crucially, the spoken and the embodied enactment of the invoice receiver’s perspective are finely 
synchronised. This synchronisation is documented in Figure 4 that shows a spectrogram of the 
utterance If it were me then it was just thrown on the pile (Danish, hvis det var mig så røg den bare 
hen i stakken), along with an indication of Black’s hand movements.  
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
The central element in Black’s narrative formula if it were me (hvis det var mig) is the 200 ms 
stressed syllable me (Dan. mig). This personal pronoun is the pivotal element in the recalibration of 
the deictic system: it bridges the perspective of Black to the perspective of the invoice receiver, 
which is presented in the subsequent main clause. This syllable coincides with Black’s catching 
movement: thus, the verbal and the embodied enactment of the receiver come together in a highly 
synchronised way. Interestingly, Black’s behavioural and verbal simulation of the receiver’s point 
of view prompts White to articulate the solution to the problem: well no but it [the CVR number] is 
there if we print on logo paper. It is thus White that picks up on Black’s cognitive work and turns it 
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into a problem identification: the problem does not pertain the computer software, but to the choice 
of printer tray! 
 
Summing up the invoice case, it has given us a rare window into insight problem solving in the 
wild. Importantly, it emphasises the systemic nature of problem solving: Black and White navigate 
in a rich environment structured by the layout of the office (Kirsh, 1995; Perry, O'Hara, Spinelli, & 
Sharpe, 2003) and the presence of cognitive artefacts (Nemeth, Cook, O'Connor, & Klock, 2004). 
Evidently, space and things do not automatically produce cognitive outputs; the cognitive system is 
animated by human components, but even the two protagonists cannot be seen as isolated 
components: to come up with a solution, they rely on the interactivity that plays out between them 
(Harvey, Gahrn-Andersen, & Steffensen, 2016; Steffensen, 2013). In particular, Black investing 
himself in repeatedly stating what the problem is—with variations that accumulate into a non-linear 
change of perspective—functions as a probe that enables the system to reconfigure.  
 
Conclusion 
Interactivity is at the heart of problem solving outside the psychologist’s laboratory, and as we have 
shown in this chapter, it is possible to explore interactivity under laboratory conditions as well. The 
complexity and hence the creative arborisation potential is guided and constrained by the material 
artefacts offered. Tasks where participants can interact with a physical and malleable problem 
unveil a very different range of multiscalar processes than when problems are presented as static 
verbal descriptions; in fact, they unveil very different reasoners, or more specifically they unveil 
how the reasoner-environment system does thinking. A physical model of the problem offers a 
physical record of the creative arc, the problem solving trajectory, and as an external storage device, 
it augments the systemic working memory resources. But this is not simply an external storage 
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story. The physical model, there to be examined and acted upon, reduces or eliminates the 
representational burden. So-called executive functions such as updating and attention shifting, are 
cued and governed by changes in the configuration of the problem elements. Problem solving is 
enacted at different time scales: unmediated actions are triggered by the shifting affordances at the 
faster end, and deliberate analysis of results at the slower end. 
 
The acknowledgement of the multiscalar character of problem solving provides us with a better 
understanding of one of the most characteristic behavioural tendencies of problem solvers facing an 
impasse: their recurrence to cyclical repetitions of behaviour. In the invoice case, Black cyclically 
repeated his perception of the nature of the problem, in the 17A case, many solvers dealt with 
impasses by resetting the problem presentation and starting all over, and the same tendency has 
been abundantly reported in the literature (e.g., Chu, Dewald, & Chronicle, 2007). 
 
While these repetitions are cognitively vacuous from a mentalist point of view, because they do not 
indicate changes in computational processing, an ecological approach argues that “this repetition is 
not mere repetition because it is contextualized by actively perceiving the world” (Cowley & Nash, 
2013:193). Cyclicity then becomes a way of investigating, or indeed creating, unnoticed 
affordances for problem solving. Repeating yourself can be sensible, exactly because the repetition 
will likely not be a perfect replication, and the small variations may lead to outcomes—not unlike 
how genetic variation can lead to mutations: “You cannot step twice into exactly the same idea” as 
Ingold (2014, p. 127) puts it. One can hypothesise that repetitions on an observational meso 
timescale (which tend to steal the attention because they are so salient for the observer) depend on 
micro-scale variations that changes the problem landscape, and that these in turn constitute macro-
scale systemic transformations (i.e., what we observe as the agent solving the problem). On this 
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hypothesis, the creative arc in problem solving is constituted by a nested hierarchy of variation and 
cyclicity. More research is needed in order to establish on which timescales variation and cyclicity 
most optimally occur, and to establish how this multiscalar pattern depends on the nature of the 
problem, the solvers, and the ecosystems in which they are embedded.  
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Figure 1. A solution for the 17 animals problem.  
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Figure 2. The cognitive ecosystem. Black is sitting at his desk with a print version of the flawed 
invoice in his left hand. White is standing next to him, holding a pile of task irrelevant papers in his 
hand.  
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Figure 3. Black enacts the imagined invoice receiver: he lets go of the paper and catches it again, 
thus embodying the “receiving movement” of the invoice receiver. 
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Figure 4. A spectrogram of Black’s utterance If it were me then it was just thrown on the pile 
(Danish, hvis det var mig så røg den bare hen i stakken). The three stressed syllables mig, bare, 
sta(kken) (English, me, just, (the) pile) are rendered in phonetic transcription. Over the spectrogram, 
Black’s hand movements are indicated. The blue squares indicate synchronisation between speech 
and hand movements: (i) beginning of utterance and beginning of hand movement (90 ms); (ii) 
catching the piece of paper and the stressed syllable mig (me) (50 ms); (iii) moving the hand 
forward and the stressed syllable bare (just); and (iv) end of utterance and letting go of paper that 
continues into the pile (50 ms). 
	
 
	
	
 
